University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 9
Number 3 Antitrust Symposium

Article 14

7-1-1984

H. 271: "Buy Ohio"
Elizabeth G. Smith
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Smith, Elizabeth G. (1984) "H. 271: "Buy Ohio"," University of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 9: No. 3, Article 14.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/14

This Legislative Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

H. 271: "Buy OHIO"
I.

INTRODUCTION

By January 1983, the nationwide economic recession had been
deeply felt in Ohio. The unemployment rate was at a record high,' and
the state had experienced a general economic deterioration unseen
since the Great Depression.' The sagging economic environment
prompted the state government to institute the remedial measures
popularly known as "Buy Ohio." Governor Richard Celeste's first official proclamation was Executive Order 83-1, in which he required all
state agencies to give preference to Ohio companies in their purchase of
goods and services.3 This program is intended to improve economic conditions in Ohio by creating employment opportunities and stimulating
4
growth and development of the business climate within the state.
Executive Order 83-1 was enacted into law on July 11, 1983, by
Amended House Bill 271.6 The bill reorganizes the competitive-bidding
procedure for state contracts by favoring Ohio bidders over out-of-state
bidders.
This note will focus on the procedural changes H. 271 makes in
the state purchasing process, the potential substantive effect the bill
will have on state purchasing, and its possible impact on Ohio's
economy.
II. BACKGROUND

Through state purchasing, the taxpayers' money is used to equip,
maintain, and construct the public facilities of the state. Because tax
dollars are used, a primary goal of state purchasing is to protect the
best interests of the public--a goal that has long been assumed best
served by the promotion of competition and the discouragement of
7
favoritism.

1. In January 1983, the unemployment rate was 14.9%. OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT
SERVICES, OHIO DEP'T OF LABOR, OHIO LABOR FORCE ESTIMATES BY COUNTY (Jan. 1983).
2.

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA
519 (1982); Ohio Exec. Order No. 83-1 (Jan. 10, 1983) (on file with University of
Dayton Law Review).
3. Ohio Exec. Order No. 83-1 (Jan. 10, 1983).
4. id.
5. Act of July 11, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-259 (Baldwin) (codified at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 125.01, 125.04, 125.08, 125.09, 125.11, 127.16, 153.012, 5513.02 (Page Supp.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

DATA BOOK

1983)).
6. State ex rel. H.P. Clough & Co. v. Commissioners of Shelby County, 36 Ohio St. 326,
331 (1881).
7. United States Constructors and Consultants, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous.
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To achieve these ends, the process of competitive bidding is required of all state purchases over $5,000.8 Competitive-bidding procedures require all interested parties to make an offer to provide supplies
and services by submitting a "bid." The bids are evaluated and the
party submitting the "lowest and best" bid is then awarded the
contract. 9
The underlying purpose of competitive bidding suggests that it is
not simply a procedure for awarding contracts. Rather, the competitive-bidding process, by giving "everyone an equal chance to bid, . . .
fosters honest competition" and lessens the possibility of favoritism.1
For this reason, the competitive-bidding requirements have always been
interpreted as having been enacted for the benefit of the taxpayers, and
not the bidders.1
Notwithstanding the fact that the goal of competitive bidding is to
secure the lowest price, bid price has not been the only consideration in
awarding state contracts. Since the 1800's, evaluation of bids has generally involved factors other than price."2 The language of Ohio's previous competitive-bidding statute mandated awarding the contract to the
"lowest and best bidder."'" This language has been interpreted to confer a certain amount of discretion on those in charge of evaluating the
bids.' The term "best" has thereby involved consideration of factors
such as the financial stability of the bidder,' 5 the ability of the bidder
to perform the contract,"' the past performance of the bidder,'7 and the

Auth., 35 Ohio App. 2d 159, 163, 300 N.E.2d 452, 454 (1973).
8. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 125.07 (Page Supp. 1982).
9. Id. § 125.11 (Page Supp. 1982), amended by Act of July 11, 1983, 1983 Ohio Legis.
Serv. 5-259 (Baldwin) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 125.01, 125.04, 125.08, 125.09,
125.11, 127.16, 153.012, 5513.02 (Page Supp. 1983)).
10. 35 Ohio App. 2d at 163, 300 N.E.2d at 454.
Ii. Id. As early as 1881, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the competitive-bidding requirements a means of serving the public. Accordingly, they "should be executed with sole reference to the public interest." 36 Ohio St. at 331. The central purpose of these statutes is the public
interest because public tax dollars finance the contracts that are awarded. Therefore, competitive
bidding ensures that the best product will be obtained for the lowest possible price. 35 Ohio App.
2d at 163, 300 N.E.2d at 454.
12. State ex rel. Mills & Co. v. Commissioners of Hamilton County, 20 Ohio St. 425, 430
(1870). Consideration of other factors was sanctioned despite language mandating award of the
contract to the "lowest bidder." Id. See also Dayton ex rel. Scandrick v. McGee, 67 Ohio St. 2d
356, 423 N.E.2d 1095 (1981).
13. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 125.11 (Page Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
14. State ex rel. Roger J. Au & Son v. Studebaker, 120 Ohio App. 68, 70, 201 N.E.2d 230,
232, a'd mem., 175 Ohio St. 222, 193 N.E.2d 84 (1963). The word "best" allows consideration
of more than just the dollar figure. The public official is required to choose the "best" bid based
upon an exercise of honest discretion of which bid is best. Id. at 70-71, 201 N.E.2d at 232.
15. Dalton v. Kunde, 31 Ohio Misc. 75, 87, 286 N.E.2d 483, 492 (C.P. Ct. Montgomery
County 1971).
16. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/14
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number of minority workers a contractor employs. 8
The discretion to decide which bid is the "best" inevitably creates
a potential for favoritism. However, since Ohio has conferred the discretion and the Ohio courts have sanctioned its use, 19 the only issue is
the amount of discretion which will be tolerated. Ohio courts have declared that only where there is an abuse of discretion will the courts
interfere with its exercise. 0 Abuse of discretion has been defined as
behavior not governed by fixed standards which has an element of unreasonableness, arbitrariness, or unconscionability.2 1 Consequently, if
there are adequate guidelines which define and limit the ability of an
official to exercise personal choice, there is no abuse of discretion. 2
III.
A.

PROVISIONS OF

H. 271

The Federal Counterpart

H. 271 is patterned after the federal "Buy America Act," which
has been in effect since 1933.23 "Buy America" was enacted by the
United States Congress during the Depression as an economic measure
aimed at protecting the United States economy from foreign competition.2 4 The provisions of the federal law require that all purchases of
public goods, including those used in construction and repair of public

17. Id. at 94, 286 N.E.2d at 493.
18. Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907
(1969). In response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Governor Rhodes issued the Executive Order
of June 5, 1967, which required public contractors to hire minority employees. Each contractor
had to submit an affirmative-action plan guaranteeing employment of minorities. The Ohio Supreme Court has found this requirement to be a reasonable requirement of the "best-bidder"
standard. Id. at 39, 249 N.E.2d at 910.
19. See 67 Ohio St. 2d at 360, 423 N.E.2d at 1098; State ex rel. Walton v. Hermann, 63
Ohio St. 440, 442, 59 N.E. 104, 105 (1900).
20. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 360, 423 N.E.2d at 1098; 19 Ohio St. 2d at 40, 249 N.E.2d at 911.
21. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 359, 423 N.E.2d at 1097; see also State ex tel. Sharer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 159 Ohio St. 581, 113 N.E.2d 14 (1953) (where the supreme court defined an
abuse of discretion as more than erroneous judgment). According to the court in Shafer, there
must be "a perversity of will, passion, prejudice, and partiality, or moral delinquency" to be an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 590-91, 113 N.E.2d at 19.
22. In Scandrick, the supreme court found that the lack of announced standards for acceptance of bids made the actions of the official arbitrary. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 360, 423 N.E.2d at 1098.
The case concerned a Dayton city-residency requirement. When reviewing the requirement, the
supreme court indicated that a preference of residents was not objectionable. Rather, it was the
lack of guidelines which caused a problem. Id. See also Dalton v. Kunde, 31 Ohio Misc. 75, 286
N.E.2d 483 (C.P. Ct. Montgomery County 1971) (where a Montgomery County Common Pleas
Court used the same reasoning and found no abuse of discretion because there were sufficient
guidelines to control the use of discretion).
23. Buy America Act of 1933, ch. 212, tit. II1, §§ 1-3, 47 Stat. 1489, 1520 (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ IOa-10c (1976)).
24.by 76
CONG. REC.1983
1891-96 (1933).
Published
eCommons,
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buildings and public works, be of American-made products.15 The result is that United States companies are secured an advantage over foreign companies in the federal bidding process. "Buy America" is implemented by an administrative agency of the United States government
which has promulgated regulations supervising the "Buy America"
program."'
The Buy America Act was consulted by the drafters of H. 271.'1
H. 271 actually implements the federal plan on the state level, in fact,
as Ohio bid evaluators are specifically required to reject all bids offering goods not produced or mined in the United States.2 8 However, H.
271 is more comprehensive than Buy America because Ohio bidders
are favored over out-of-state bidders.2 9 Consequently, "Buy Ohio" assures Ohio bidders in state contracts what "Buy America" assures
American companies in federal contracts.
In the same manner as the federal Act, H. 271 will be implemented by an administrative agency. The Department of Administrative Services (D.A.S.) is required to promulgate regulations governing
the Ohio preference system.3 0 The regulations which D.A.S. enacts are
to conform to "Buy America" to the extent possible."1
B.

Overview of H. 271

H. 271 creates two separate preference systems to be used in
awarding state contracts. The first preference system governs the
purchase of supplies and equipment for all state agencies.32 This provision secures an advantage in the bid evaluation procedure to bidders
supplying Ohio products.33 The second preference system applies to
contracts for the construction and repair of public improvements." Although not as broad as the preference system for goods, this preference
ensures that contractors with their principal place of business in Ohio
will receive preferential treatment over out-of-state contractors who re5
ceive a similar preference in their home state.
Both of these provisions create specific changes in the competitivebidding process. More significantly, H. 271 in its entirety substantially

25.
26.

27.

41 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
See 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-6.100-.106 (1983).
See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 125.09(C) (Page Supp. 1983).
Id. § 125.11(B).

28.
29. Id.
30. Id.§ 125.09(C).
31. Id. § 125.09(C)(7).
32. Id. § 125.11(B).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 153.012.
35. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/14
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alters the focus of state purchasing by changing the goal of competitive
bidding from unfettered competition to protectionism.
C. Preference of Ohio Products
The first preference system, governing supplies and services,
changes prior law in three areas: 1) the role of the Department of Administrative Services, 2) the procedure for submitting bids, and 3) the
procedure for evaluating bids.
The first change gives more power to the D.A.S. in purchasing
goods for state agencies. The real authority to implement "Buy Ohio"
lies with the D.A.S., for it will determine all the criteria necessary to
implement the preference system." This is a substantial change from
past procedure: under prior law, only those state agencies for which the
D.A.S. did purcliasing were bound by D.A.S. regulations.37 Now, all
state agencies must follow these regulations, regardless of who does the
purchasing for them."
The bill further facilitates the preference for Ohio products by
making a change in the bid notification procedure. Under prior law, the
D.A.S. was required to maintain a "bid notification list" which classified potential bidders by the product they supplied as well as the geographic area in which the bidder desired to work. 9 Anyone was entitled to have his or her name placed on the bid notification list by
sending a written request to the D.A.S., 40 and this list was consulted
whenever the D.A.S. received a request from a state agency for supplies or equipment. 41 All potential bidders dealing in that product and
area were then notified that bids were being accepted. 42
In keeping with the old law, the D.A.S. is required to maintain a
notification
list.43 However, H. 271 requires the D.A.S. to send nobid
tice that bids are being accepted only to Ohio enterprises44 unless the
director deems it to be "in the best interests of Ohio" to notify all enterprises on the list.4' Depending upon the interpretation given "best
interests of Ohio," the practical effect of this new procedure may be
36.
37.

Id.§ 125.09(C).

Id. § 125.04;

OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, BILL ANALYSIS: AM.

REPORTED BY THE SENATE)

38. OHIO REV. CODE
COMM'N, supra note 37.

H.B. 271 (As

(1983).
ANN. §

125.04 (Page Supp. 1983);

'OHIo

LEGISLATIVE SERV.

39. Id. § 125.08(A) (Page Supp. 1982).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 125.08(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
44. Id. The bill specifically includes Ohio prison industries. Id.
45. Id. For a discussion of interpretation of "best interests of Ohio," see infra notes 66-67
and accompanying
text. 1983
Published
by eCommons,

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:3

the routine exclusion of out-of-state bidders before the evaluation pro6
cess begins.'
The cornerstone of the preference system is found in the evaluation process. H. 271 institutes a two-step decision procedure which
eliminates all non-United States goods and effectively ensures the
award of the contract to an Ohio producer. The bill provides that when
all bids are received and the evaluation begins, the evaluators must first
reject all bids offering goods that are not produced in the United
States.' 7 After non-United States goods have been rejected, the "lowest
and best bid" will be selected from among the bids offering Ohio products.' 8 In typical situations, out-of-state products will not be
9
considered.'
D.

Preference of Ohio Services

H. 271 also institutes a preference system for the awarding of contracts for the construction or repair of public improvements.' Its provisions are not as restrictive as the preference system governing the
purchase of supplies and equipment; the preference system for construction contracts is actually a reciprocity requirement.
The bill provides that in any contract for the construction"' of any
public improvement 5 2 made by the state, preference must be given to
contractors having their principal place of business in Ohio over bidders from a state which has a similar preference system." Under these
circumstances, the Ohio contractor is given the same advantage in Ohio
as the out-of-state contractor receives in his or her home state.4
If any out-of-state bidder comes from a state that does not employ
a similar preference, the Ohio preference provisions do not apply." The
present state of the law renders the use of this provision improbable, as
no border state gives preference to its own contractors."

46. The coordinator of "Buy Ohio" maintains that the goal of H. 271 is not to have only
Ohio enterprises on the bid notification list. Interview with Shvam Srivastava, coordinator of Buy
Ohio, in Columbus, Ohio (Sept. 21, 1983) (hereinafter cited as Srivastava interview].
47. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 125.11(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
48. Id.
49. H. 271 is an attempt to declare that Ohio products are best. Address to Ohio Senate in
support of House Bill 271 (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 153.012 (Page Supp. 1983).
51. The bill states "construction, reconstruction, improvement, enlargement, alteration, repair, painting or decoration." Id.
52. The statute specifically includes highway improvements. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Contractors from border states are most likely to travel into Ohio to bid on construction
contracts. A survey of the legislative provisions of neighboring states pertaining to state construchttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/14
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IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Language of the Bill

The purpose of H. 271 is to improve the economic conditions
within Ohio by encouraging small businesses. 57 And by securing an advantage to Ohio bidders, it is anticipated that there will be an increase
in production which will lead to an increase in employment opportunities within the state. 58 In addition, there may be an increase in Ohio
revenue as a result of larger profits due to increased demand for Ohio
products.5 9
In theory, the bill should produce the desired effects. However,
practical application may result in frequent circumvention of the bill's
requirements, rendering it virtually useless. There are four undefined
phrases in H. 271 which render it particularly susceptible to
circumvention.
The first phrase, "significant economic presence," allows an out-ofstate company to circumvent the restrictions of the bill if the company
has a significant economic presence within Ohio." This provision was
not included in the original bill but was added only after legislators
recognized that some large companies which had a substantial interest
in Ohio and had been awarded contracts in the past would not qualify
as offering "Ohio products."'" The language was added to ensure that
larger companies who contribute to Ohio's economy would not be foreclosed from state contracts in the future because the products they offered were not technically "Ohio products." 2
The D.A.S. is charged with the responsibility of promulgating criteria for determining when an out-of-state company has a significant
economic presence. 63 Although the bill itself gives no guidelines as to

tion contracts reveals that no border state employs a preference of its own citizens over out-ofstate bidders. See IND. CODE ANN. § 5-16-1-1.2 to 5-16-2.2 (West Supp. 1983); 200 Ky. ADMIN.
REGS. 5:306 (1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 830.412(i) (West 1982); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 638 (Purdon Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 5-6-7 (1979).
57. Interview with Clifford Skeen, Ohio state representative, in Columbus, Ohio (Sept. 21,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Skeen interview] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review);
Srivastava interview, supra note 46.
58. Srivastava interview, supra note 46.
59. Id.
60. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 125.09(C)(5) (Page Supp. 1983).
61. The sponsor of the bill indicated that this was a problem with the original bill. Some
large automotive companies expressed concern because they manufactured component parts in
Ohio but the finished products were assembled in Canada and other states. Skeen interview, supra
note 57. Those concerned feared exclusion as a result of the new system. Letter from William H.
Eells, regional manager of Ford Motor Co., to Ohio State Senator Thomas E. Carney (June 3,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Ford letter] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
62. Skeen interview, supra note 57.
63.byOHIO
REV. CODE
ANN. § 125.09(C)(5) (Page Supp. 1983).
Published
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how economic presence should be defined, the reason for incorporating
the phrase into the bill indicates that the D.A.S. should consider such

factors as Ohio taxes paid and employment of Ohio residents when deciding whether an out-of-state company has a significant economic
presence.

Two other ambiguous phrases used in H. 271 are "disproportionately inferior product" and "excessive price." Each provides a basis for
waiver of the preference provision. 64 There is no specific section charging the D.A.S. with promulgating a definition of these terms. However,
the mandate that the D.A.S. conform to "Buy America" indicates that
a standard will be developed to determine when a product is disproportionately inferior or excessively priced.

The fourth undefined term, "in the best interests of Ohio," is used
in the section containing the bid notification list and procedure. 66 Since
the new requirements allow the director to send notice that bids are
being accepted only to Ohio bidders unless it is "in the best interests of
Ohio" to send notice to all bidders on the list, 7 the phrase could determine whether or not out-of-state bidders will be excluded without even
a chance to reveal the product offered and the price.

There is no indication in the bill that any criteria will be established to define this phrase. Without further guidance, the director
must use personal discretion when deciding if it is in the best interests
of Ohio to notify all bidders.
B.

Exceptions
There have been accusations that the provisions of Executive Or-

der 83-1 have not been enforced and that "Buy Ohio" is nothing more
than a political gimmick.66 There is merit to this accusation be64.

id. § 125.09(C)(6).

65. "Buy Ohio" uses the phrases "disproportionately inferior product" and "excessive price"
in the same manner that "Buy America" uses "cost to be unreasonable" and "inconsistent with
public interest." 41 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1976). The Code of Federal Regulations provides a standard
procedure for making the determination that it is not in the best interests of the public or that the
price is excessive. Under this standard, each foreign bid is evaluated against the domestic bids
after 6% of the total foreign bid amount is added to the foreign bid (12% if the domestic competitor is a small business). If the foreign bid is still lower than the domestic bid, the domestic bid is
deemed unreasonable or inconsistent with the public interest. If there is a tie, the domestic company is awarded the contract. 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.104-4 (1983).
66. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 125.08(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
67. Id.
68. Representative Michael Fox accused the Celeste administration of purchasing foreign
products despite its commitment to Buy Ohio. The administration had ordered steel which was
made in the Neitherlands when there were qualified Ohio producers available. M. Fox, Press
Statement (Aug. 16, 1983). However, the Celeste administration quieted this accusation by rejecting a delivery of foreign-made steel bound for the Lebanon Correctional Institution. Graham,
Ohio Rejects Dutch Steel, Dayton Journal Herald, Aug. 27, 1983, at 3, col. 6.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/14

19841

LEGISLATION NOTES

cause-in addition to broad, undefined language-the bill contains four
provisions which allow officials in charge of purchasing to bypass the
preference requirement for goods and services. These exceptions allow
companies that do not supply Ohio products to stand on an equal footing with companies supplying in-state products.
The first exception is that sufficient competition must be generated
within Ohio before those evaluating the bids are required to choose an
Ohio product.6 The legislation has narrowed the exception, however,
by designating that "sufficient competition" exists when two or more
70
bidders offer Ohio products.
The second exception is that non-Ohio bidders who have significant economic presence in Ohio stand on equal ground with Ohio
bidders. 1
The third exception is a reciprocity provision which allows bidders
from neighboring states to qualify for award of contracts despite their
out-of-state status. 7 2 Bidders from neighboring states are qualified if
there is sufficient commerce between Ohio and the border state, and if
the border state imposes no greater restrictions on Ohio bidders than
H. 271 imposes on out-of-state bidders.7" The current state of the law
in neighboring states makes this a rule rather than an exception, as
only one border state favors in-state products over out-of-state
products.74
It is evident that the undefined language and the exceptions contained in the bill cover a wide variety of situations and have the potential to be frequently employed to bypass H. 271. If the D.A.S. does not
narrow the scope of the language of the bill, the effect of H. 271 will
amount to nothing more than public relations for the Celeste
administration.
C.

The Effect on Discretion

The most pervasive aspect of H. 271 may be its effect on the discretion vested in public officials. The provisions of H. 271 confer

69. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 125.11(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 125.09(C)(5). For a discussion of the interpretation of "significant economic presence" see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
72. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.09(C)(4).
73. Id.
74. West Virginia employs a preference for resident vendors in state contracts for supplies
and equipment. W. VA. CODE § 5A-3-44 (1979). However, if the resident bid exceeds the out-ofstate bid by 2%, the preference does not apply. Id. No other border state employs such a preference. See IND. CODE ANN. § 5-17-1-2 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 424.260 (Baldwin 1983); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 17.28 (1981) (only if all factors are equal will preference be given to the instate supplier);
PA. CONS. 1983
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1612 (1962).
Published
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greater discretion in three areas: the bid notification procedure, the
evaluation procedure, and the waiver provision.
The first example of additional discretion is the new provision governing the bid notification list." Notices to bid will be restricted to
bidders offering Ohio products unless the director deems it to be in the
best interests of Ohio to send notice to all bidders.7 6
The second instance of increased discretion is found in the bid
evaluation procedure. The bill requires the awarding of the contract to
the lowest and best bid offering an Ohio product.77 The evaluator decides whether or not a bid offers an Ohio product."
The waiver provision also confers greater discretion on public officials than under prior law. 79 H. 271 permits the bid evaluator to waive
the preference requirement if he or she determines that favoring an
Ohio bidder will result in "acquiring an inferior product" or paying an
"excessive price. ' 8°
With all of these changes, the potential for favoritism is great. In
each situation, a public official will be making an important choice affecting the preference system. Prior law has established that the choice
will be subject to attack only if it is an abuse of discretion.81 Consequently, any gray areas in the process of implementation will provide a
framework within which the public official is free to exercise personal
choice.
D.

ConstitutionalIssues

Any state preference system has the chance of being invalidated
on federal constitutional grounds. Several states have attempted to improve their own economic conditions by enacting such legislation. The
legislation has been attacked either under the commerce clause82 or the
privileges and immunities clause. 8s These two constitutional provisions

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.08(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
Id.
Id. § 125.11(B).
Id.
Id. § 125.09(C)(6).

80. Id. For a discussion of the interpretation of "disproportionately inferior product" and
"excessive price," see supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
81. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
82. The motivation behind the commerce clause was to create and foster development of a
common market among the states and prevent internal trade barriers. See THE FEDERALIST No.
42, at 268 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1961).
83. The clause relied on by petitioners has been article IV, § 2. For a discussion of the
distinction between these privileges and immunities and 14th amendment privileges or immunities,
see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). The purpose of the privileges and
immunities clause illustrates that the Framers of the Constitution specifically sought to prevent
favoritism on the part of each state. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 477-78 (A. Hamilton)
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/14
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have been a source of successful challenge, often resulting in repeal of
state preference systems.
The success of a challenge under the commerce clause is dependent upon the purpose of the legislation as well as what the legislation
restricts."' If the purpose of the legislation is to favor state goods and
services, the necessary effect is a restriction on incoming commerce.
Since this is a potential violation of the commerce clause, the United
States Supreme Court would take an active role in reviewing state legway favors in-state goods and services over out-ofislation which in any
85
counterparts.
state
The standard of review employed by the Supreme Court is that
where the state legislation requires private industry to exclude out-ofstate products in order to favor local industry for economic reasons, the
legislation violates the commerce clause.8 6 In this situation, the state

acts as a "market regulator."8

However, where the purpose of the legislation is to favor state
products and services but the restriction is imposed only upon state
agencies when acting in their purchasing capacity, a commerce clause
challenge will fail. The United States Supreme Court has reviewed legislation mandating the award of state contracts to local industry and

concluded that this situation differs from the regulation of private industry.88 When a state purchases for its own agencies, it is entering the
market as a "market participant." 89 The commerce clause is violated
only where the state regulates private industry and not when it enters
the market as a participant.' 0 Consequently, although the practical ef-

(Mod. Libr. ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 270 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1961).
84. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 256-60
(1978).
85. Id. at 259.
86. See generally Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
87. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 51 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4212 (U.S.
Feb. 28, 1983).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The Supreme Court reaffirmed two prior cases dealing with this same issue. In
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld Maryland
legislation governing recycling of abandoned automobiles. The statute required documentation of
ownership before a bounty could be collected. Documentation requirements were more exacting
for out-of-state processors than for in-state processors. The Court stated "[n]othing in the purpose
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id. at
810. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), the Court noted that the commerce clause
does not limit the ability of the states themselves to operate freely in the free market. Id. at
436-37. The Supreme Court also noted that restraint in this area is also counselled by considerations of state sovereignty, the role of each state "as guardian and trustee for its people." Heim v.
McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915) (quoting.Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222 (1903)).
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fect may be to restrict the inflow of commerce, the United States Supreme Court has established that the commerce clause does not pose a
barrier to this type of state action. 91
H. 271 will clearly withstand a commerce clause challenge. Since
the restriction is placed only upon state agencies, the state will be considered a market participant. Consequently, the commerce clause is not
violated despite the restriction of incoming commerce.
One specific type of preference system has suffered increased vulnerability under the privileges and immunities clause. The United
States Supreme Court has declared that legislation mandating the
award of state contracts to contractors who employ a minimum percentage of state residents over those contractors who employ out-ofstate residents violates the privileges and immunities clause. 92 In Hicklin v. Orbeck, the United States Supreme Court, after concluding that
the situation was one in which the protection of the clause could be
invoked, 93 subjected Alaska's residency requirement to a two-part test.
The Court first inquired whether there was a substantial reason for the
discrimination-that is, something to indicate that nonresidents were a
peculiar source of evil at which the statute was aimed.H Secondly, the
Court required that there be a reasonable relationship between the danger presented by the nonresidents and the discriminatory practice. 9"
The Court held that the nonresidents were not a peculiar source of the
high unemployment rate Alaska designated as an evil to be eliminated. 96 Several state courts have followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court and invalidated state preference systems enacted by their
legislatures. 97

91. The market-participant rationale has been questioned in the situation where the state
action has given preference to companies which employ residents of the state. Justice Blackmun,
dissenting in White, suggested that where the legislation required that state contracts be let only
to companies that employ a minimum percentage of state residents, the practical effect was market regulation. Blackmun reasoned that companies which customarily bid on state contracts will
hire only state residents in order to qualify for bid awards. Since these companies will work on
private contracts as well as state contracts, the legislation is actually regulating the market. 51
U.S.L.W. at 4214-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, the only court to specifically consider
this issue held that the legislation was within the framework of a market participant. United Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 88 N.J. 317, 338, 443 A.2d 148, 159 (1982).
92. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
93. The right to ply one's trade has been held to be within the privileges and immunities
clause since the 1800's. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871).
94. 437 U.S. at 525.
95. Id. at 526.
96. Id.
97. Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v. Krause, 181 N.J. Super. 376, 437 A.2d 733 (1981),
modified, 187 N.J. Super. 174, 453 A.2d 1359 (1982), invalidated New Jersey's residency requirement, rejecting the justification of the depression in the construction industry absent a special
showing of specific danger caused by the nonresidents. Id. at 385, 437 A.2d at 738. In Salla v.
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Challenge to H: 271 under the privileges and immunities clause
also has little chance of success. The first preference system in H. 271
applies to products themselves, as opposed to the employees who produce those products. 98 The United States Supreme Court has declared
that corporations cannot invoke the protection of the privileges and immunities clause. 99 Therefore, a privileges and immunities challenge will
fail unless the out-of-state bidder denied the contract is an individual
producer of goods.
The possibility of challenge to the preference system governing
construction contracts is likely nonexistent under present law. Since no
contracts, the
border state has a preference system for construction
1 00
apply.
not
will
271
H.
in
system
preference
V.

CONCLUSION

Supporters of H. 271 maintain that the bill was enacted primarily
to improve economic conditions within the state. Yet an analysis of the
provisions of the bill along with its necessary effect illustrates that
"Buy Ohio" falls far short of its purported goal.
The theory of the bill is in conflict with the basic principle of a
common market among the states.101 By instituting a preference for
local industry, "Buy Ohio" advocates a trade barrier and invites similar
economic retaliation from other states. Although the bill requires bid
evaluators to recognize the level of commerce between Ohio and neighbor states, "Buy Ohio" is basically a protectionist measure.
In addition, the bill is in conflict with the primary objects of competitive bidding. The structure of H. 271 will increase discretion on the
part of public officials involved in the state purchasing process in spite
of the long-standing object of competitive bidding as a guard against
County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1979), a New York court held that
New York's residency requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 518, 399
N.E.2d at 913. The court rejected the idea that the nonresidents were a peculiar source of the
high unemployment rate New York designated as an evil. Id. at 523, 399 N.E.2d at 914. In
Laborers Union Local No. 374 v. Felton Constr. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 121, 654 P.2d 67 (1982), the
Washington Supreme Court invalidated Washington's residency requirement, holding that the
state's justification of strengthening the economic welfare of state and local economies could not
satisfy the two-part test because the state did not have evidence to prove that nonresidents were a
peculiar source of evil. Id. at 129, 654 P.2d at 70. But see People ex rel. Holland v. Bleigh Constr.
Co., 61 Ili. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975), where the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a residency
requirement in the face of a privileges and immunities clause challenge. Id. at 273, 335 N.E.2d at
478-79.
98. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.11(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
99. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 170 (1869). The United States Supreme Court
held that a corporation is not a "person" for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause. id.
at 177.
100. See supra note 5.
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 268 (J. Madison) (Mod. Libr. ed. 1961).
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favoritism. Another long-standing object of competitive bidding has
been the acquiring of the best product. H. 271 distorts that goal to
acquisition of the best "Ohio product."
Finally, the mechanics of H. 271 render achievement of its goal
improbable. Although the bill purports to require preference of Ohio
products and services, its provisions are vague and provide possibilities
for frequent circumvention. In fact, the reciprocity provisions ensure
limited enforcement of "Buy Ohio" until a border state employs a similar protectionist measure.
As a result of the problems in theory and in practice, H. 271's
most effective feature is the public relations benefit it provides for the
Celeste administration.
Elizabeth G. Smith
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